{"items": [{"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360263145425", "service": "gp", "text": "Jeff said: \"... Maybe an all-pay auction (like a dollar auction) would be better: whichever of AMF and CFAR got more donations would get the full match from me. Among rational mixed-strategy-utilizing donors this should result in $X moved by an $X pool on average, but people being imperfect I would expect to see more than $X moved.\"\n<br>\n<br>\nI don't see it. Are you talking about something like a Nash equilibrium?", "timestamp": 1360263145}, {"author": "Jeff&nbsp;Kaufman", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/103013777355236494008", "anchor": "gp-1360264592282", "service": "gp", "text": "@David&nbsp;Chudzicki\n\u00a0I'm thinking of this as equivalent to simply auctioning off $X via an all-pay auction. \u00a0Bids are donations. \u00a0This requires you being indifferent to which charity gets which money. \u00a0If that's reasonable, then you get an expected money-moved of $X via revenue equivalence.\n<br>\n<br>\nSome looking makes me think this might only be true for sealed-bid all-pay auctions, though, in which case I'm not sure it applies here.", "timestamp": 1360264592}, {"author": "Jeff&nbsp;Kaufman", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/103013777355236494008", "anchor": "gp-1360264649156", "service": "gp", "text": "(It's also tricky in that you can't practically require \"all donations must be money that wouldn't otherwise be donated to charities I think are anywhere near this good\")", "timestamp": 1360264649}, {"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360265345404", "service": "gp", "text": "Got it, thanks.", "timestamp": 1360265345}, {"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360265408244", "service": "gp", "text": "(For anyone else out there, this is the passage in wikipedia that helped me: \"In an all-pay auction the Nash Equilibrium is such that each bidder plays a mixed strategy and his expected pay-off is zero[citation needed]. The seller's expected revenue is equal to the value of the prize. However, some experiments have shown that over-bidding is common. That is, the seller's revenue frequently exceeds that of the value of the prize, and in repeated games even bidders that win the prize frequently will most likely make a loss in the long run.[1]\".\n<br>\n<br>\nAll implied by what Jeff said, but Wikipedia is more of an authority.)", "timestamp": 1360265408}, {"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360265516657", "service": "gp", "text": "I suspect that (provably) the change from adding more people to each \"team\" doesn't really matter.", "timestamp": 1360265516}, {"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360265550679", "service": "gp", "text": "I suspect you're right that the change from drawing out the contest over time does matter.", "timestamp": 1360265550}, {"author": "David&nbsp;Chudzicki", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/106120852580068301475", "anchor": "gp-1360265814753", "service": "gp", "text": "\"all donations must be money that wouldn't otherwise be donated to charities I think are anywhere near this good\" -- this is more than a practical limitation -- I think it's literally impossible given the assumptions. Since if they value your (e.g. $1000) donation like money, then they'd be donating $1000 anyway, contradicting the condition.", "timestamp": 1360265814}]}