{"items": [{"author": "Todd", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/112947709146257842066", "anchor": "gp-1343305256216", "service": "gp", "text": "Why would all these additional Todds matter to me? I don't feel like there's more of me then there used to be. If I eat chocolate now, I don't gain more utility from it then I did an hour ago.\n
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\nIf for some reason I'm determined to care about them for altruistic reasons, then I would just ask whether present and future utility is all that matters. If I eat the chocolate now, I get utility from it. I then split into a bunch of Todds, who all remember having eaten and enjoyed the chocolate. I'm not sure that's different in any important way from doing the splitting first. And in fact, it guarantees that none of the splits result in differences in decisions or unanticipated events that prevent some of them from eating the chocolate.", "timestamp": 1343305256}, {"author": "Jeff Kaufman", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/103013777355236494008", "anchor": "gp-1343313307154", "service": "gp", "text": "@Todd\n\u00a0\"Why would all these additional Todds matter to me?\"\n
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\nEven if you're not utilitarian, those Todds are very similar to you and (assuming MWI) you will experience being all of them.\n
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\n\"If I eat the chocolate now, I get utility from it. I then split into a bunch of Todds, who all remember having eaten and enjoyed the chocolate. I'm not sure that's different in any important way from doing the splitting first.\"\n
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\nMe experience with eating chocolate is that the utility is fleeting. (Which I why I chose it.) \u00a0I'd much rather be experiencing eating it than remember eating it.", "timestamp": 1343313307}, {"author": "Todd", "source_link": "https://plus.google.com/112947709146257842066", "anchor": "gp-1343317400544", "service": "gp", "text": "\"... you will experience being all of them\"\n
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\nWhat? If this is the case (and I definitely am not well-versed w/ QM), then it's not phenomenologically different from only experiencing it as one me, so it doesn't matter in terms of my own utility. I don't experience increasing utility from the same things as time goes on due to the existence of additional me.\n
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\n\"(My) experience with eating chocolate is that the utility is fleeting.\" Sure, but my point was that each one would get that experience. It doesn't really matter when it happens. In each world, at time t, I ate some chocolate and gained some utility x. So in each world, there is the same net gain in utility, however you want to measure or evaluate that. The fact that each of those worlds might share an identical history up to and beyond time t, and only diverge later, doesn't change the utility calculus.", "timestamp": 1343317400}]}